Pentagon official says any Russian cheating on nuclear arms treaty would matter little

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Pentagon: no worries about Russian nuke cheating

WASHINGTON — Even large-scale Russian cheating on a new nuclear arms treaty would have no meaningful effect on U.S. security because it would not undermine U.S. nuclear superiority, a senior Pentagon official said Tuesday.

The statement by James Miller, the Pentagon’s leading authority on nuclear arms, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing drew the wrath of Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who asked in an incredulous tone why the Obama administration negotiated the treaty if cheating doesn’t matter.

“Why have a treaty?” McCain boomed.

The ability to verify compliance with the treaty is a key point of debate as the Senate considers whether to ratify the deal, which was signed in April by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Both governments hailed it as a major breakthrough in U.S.-Russian relations and a step toward making the world safer.

The treaty, known as New START, would shrink the limit on strategic warheads to 1,550 for each country, down about a third from the current ceiling of 2,200. It requires approval by the legislatures of both nations; the Russian Duma is waiting for the U.S. Senate to act first.

Prospects for ratification are considered strong for the treaty, which has drawn wide bipartisan support among think tank experts and former top-ranking officials. But Senate approval might not happen until this fall.

Miller told the committee that the size and structure of the U.S. arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons — the so-called triad of submarines, bomber aircraft and land-based launchers — provide assurance that any Russian cheating would have little military significance for the U.S.

“Because the United States will retain a diverse triad of strategic forces, any Russian cheating under the treaty would have little effect on the assured second-strike capabilities of U.S. strategic forces,” Miller said. He added that he does not believe Russian cheating is likely.

The ability of U.S. missile-bearing submarines and bombers to survive any Russian first strike, and to deliver a devastating counterstrike, would be “unaffected by even large-scale cheating” by the Russians, Miller said. That fact will discourage Russia from trying to secretly exceed the pact’s limits on warheads, he said.

What’s more, in a crisis the U.S. would be able to add extra nuclear warheads to missiles aboard submarines and bombers — a capability the Russians apparently do not have, Miller said.

“Therefore any breakout scenario would have, at most, limited military significance,” he said.

Air Force Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, which is responsible for ensuring the viability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, said he agreed with Miller that the United States could adequately defend itself in the event Moscow ignores the treaty’s limitations.

“I believe that we are in a good position” with the Russians in that regard, Chilton said.

“Well, what this brings to the casual observer’s mind, general, is that if it doesn’t have any consequences if they do any cheating, what’s the point of having a treaty?” McCain asked in response.

McCain’s point was a reminder of the Bush administration’s initial approach to nuclear arms control with Russia, which put little stock in negotiating a detailed treaty. It saw little prospect of the Russians managing a sudden, large-scale buildup of their nuclear arsenal, and so it preferred to set broad disarmament goals with the Russians instead.

Late in his second term, however, President George W. Bush did propose a new, more detailed nuclear treaty with Moscow.

Chilton said he believes that if the Russians decided to double or triple the number of their nuclear weapons, the U.S. would detect that and respond appropriately.